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Introduction − What is trust?
The word trust is a very overworked one, used in all kinds of situ-
ations to mean a wide variety of things. It can mean, amongst other
things, confidence, faith, reliance, and expectation. It is also used as a
fallback claim to justify attitudes and behaviour towards others, for ex-
ample “I can trust her with my life,” or “I just don’t trust him.” Heimer
(2001) distinguishes trust from faith, confidence, and legal trust. All four
involve some vulnerability or risk, but trust, for Heimer, differs from
the other three terms in that it is accompanied by an obligation for the
trustee to consider the perspective of the truster, and by the right of the
truster to negotiate with the trustee. Trust is also similar to reliance
but some theorists distinguish this from trust, which they say includes
an element of morality. Expectation, like risk, is part and parcel of trust,
but when expectations are strong, trust gives way to confidence.
For the purposes of this paper, I will use Weber and Carter’s (2003)
definition of trust “as an orientation between self and other whose ob-
ject is the relationship” (pp. 2−3). They also claim that “trust’s premise
is the belief that the other will take one’s perspective into account when
making a decision and will not act in ways to violate the moral stan-
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dards of the relationship” (p. 3). I use this definition as it includes the
cognitive, the moral and the social elements of trust.
Do we live in an age of distrust?
There has also been a surge in interest on the topic of trust among
academics, which is seen in the great increase in number of theoretical
and research−based books and journal articles, especially in the area of
sociology. Perhaps this increase is because of the perception that there
has been a decline in trust in society and that we now live in an “age of
distrust.” Some surveys have supported this, with people answering that
they have less trust in government than before. Writers such as Hardin
(2006) agree. He argues that we are now a “network” society rather
than a village or a community, and that there has also been a decline in
social participation. Because of these changes, we now have contact with
many more people whom we don’t trust or whom we may even distrust,
and in this sense we are in an age of distrust. This distrust, it is ar-
gued, has spurred the interest in trust.
However, perhaps it is the opposite―that we live in an age where
we need to be able to trust, and actually do trust, many more people
than we used to. This is the position of Solomon and Flores (2001) who
believe that there is more trust in the world now, and that this is what
has made people more interested in it. They believe that people may say
or even feel that they trust people and governments less in today’s
world, but their behaviour shows more trust, perhaps because it is nec-
essary.
Or perhaps this increase in interest is because “trust” is seen as a
kind of magical phenomenon that can deliver golden eggs of prosperity,
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popularity , and happiness . Fukuyama (1995 ) and Covey (2006 ) are
among those who believe in this power of trust. This is usually the de-
fault position in the literature on trust―that it is always a good thing.
Though they do not argue that trust is a sufficient condition for coopera-
tion and success, they usually believe that it is a necessary condition.
Cook, Hardin and Levi (2005), however, remind us that successful coop-
eration can also be the result of lack of trust or even of distrust. How-
ever, regardless of whether trust is necessary for all positive social in-
teractions, everyone agrees that it is a very important part of society,
modern and ancient, and that it is present in some form in our interac-
tions with other humans in our daily lives.
The importance of trust
Without thinking about it , we trust everyday. As Covey (2006 )
writes “Trust impacts us 24/7, 365 days a year” (p. 1). It is not only the
ubiquitous nature of trust that makes it important. Trust also plays a
pivotal role in how we behave and in the success of our relationships,
whether romantic, business, political, familial, or otherwise. Some, like
Covey, believe it is the most important component of all relationships.
In the subtitle of his book he refers to trust as “The one thing that
changes everything.” It is not necessary to agree with him to accept that
trust has a profound impact on motivation, on achievement, on self−es-
teem, and on satisfaction with relevant relationships and situations.
This significance and omnipresence, is perhaps, perversely, the rea-
son we don’t think about trust in our daily lives. And again perhaps it is
the reason that, until the last two decades, trust has not been the focus
of much theory and research in the social sciences. It has been consid-
ered an important component impacting on many things, but not fo-
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cused on in its own right.
My position is that, in our contemporary globalized society, real
trust, as opposed to expectation, reliance, confidence, or obligation, has
taken on an even more central role in society than previously. Because
of this, there is more pressure on individuals to choose when and how to
trust. As I previously stated, there is confusion in the literature, and in
our ordinary use of the term in daily life, on exactly what trust is and
what it is not. In agreement with Sztompka (1999), I consider trust to
have three dimensions: 1) as a characteristic of relationships, 2) as a
form of social intelligence (Goleman, 2006; Yamagishi, 1998, 2001), and
3) as a cultural rule. The second one is slightly different to Sztompka’s
personality trait, but there is similarity in its individual psychological
aspect. The first two dimensions make it doubly important that a focus
on trust be an integral part of educational policy, as education should be
based both on developing intelligences (Gardner, 1999) and on develop-
ing relationships. This is the main thrust of my argument in this paper.
It is based on my perception that education has not responded to this
need, made more urgent by the rapid changes occurring in the world un-
der the guise of globalization.
Education and trust
Cooperative Learning
Education has been slower and less enthusiastic than the other so-
cial sciences in following the trend towards a focus on trust. There have,
however, been groups, movements, and individuals that include trust−
building as an important part of their principles. Cooperative Learning
(CL) is one of these. CL has had a long and varied history, both within
and outside of Japan. Sugie (1999) gives a brief, but clear history of CL
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in Japan , including its most representative form , Buzz Learning .
Though trust is not explicitly focused on, it is often considered a neces-
sary condition on which to base Buzz Learning or other forms of CL, as
the following excerpt shows: “The realization that the teacher is there to
aid them helps the student to trust the teacher. Under these circum-
stances cooperative learning is ready to be practiced” (Inoue, 1999) .
Here the teacher spent a month trying to consider the students’ perspec-
tives, listening to them, not getting angry with them, and treating them
with respect.
CL outside of Japan has its roots in psychology, with Jigsaw (Aron-
son, 1978) perhaps its first incarnation. Since then many forms of CL
and varying theoretical positions have been developed, but the most
commonly quoted principles are Johnson and Johnson’s (1999) five ele-
ments: 1) positive interdependence, 2) individual accountability, 3) face−
to−face promotive interaction, 4) social skills, and 5) group processing.
As these elements suggest, trust is a necessary component of CL. As
with Buzz Learning in the Japanese context, trust is considered to be a
necessary condition for CL to be effective. In addition, trust is a conse-
quence of cooperation. There is thus a mutual interaction between trust
and cooperation.
Learner autonomy
Another recent development in educational theory and practice re-
lated to trust is learner autonomy, or self−directed learning. This has
been especially strong in the area of language learning (Benson, 2001).
Benson’s definition of autonomy “the capacity to take control of one’s
own learning” (p. 47) clearly shows the profound implications this ap-
proach has for changing the traditional roles of the teacher and the stu-
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dents. The teacher thus needs to be both trusting of, and trustworthy to-
wards, students. As with CL, there are variants of autonomous learning,
and teachers may focus on different aspects, such as the technological,
for self−directed learning in self−access centers, or the psychological as-
pect, where the focus is on self−regulation of learning in terms of psy-
chological factors. However, they all involve a change in the nature of
trust in the classroom.
Individual approaches
Individual educators or teams of authors have focused on trust−re-
lated ideas in the classroom. Recognizing the importance of a positive
atmosphere in the foreign or second language classroom, and of lan-
guage confidence, Davis and Rinvolucri (1990) suggest a variety of ac-
tivities to build these particular forms of trust. However, this doesn’t go
beyond the classroom, and is more related to confidence and harmony
amongst the group of students that real trust and cooperation.
Paulo Freire’s ideas include a need to be genuinely trusting and
trustworthy as teachers. His pedagogical ideas are much more all−en-
compassing and far−reaching, but they correspond closely to part of my
argument for a pedagogy of trust. In Teachers as cultural workers , he
advises novice teachers feeling fear on the first day of teaching to “tell
the learners, in a demonstration of being human and limited, how one
feels at the time” (2005, p. 87). He acknowledges that this requires
“deep trust―not naive but critical trust―in people” (p. 88).
My proposal, though it incorporates this idea of trust, is definitely
less ambitious and profound than Freire’s. However, it is different from
the range of approaches listed above in that it involves a committed fo-
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cus on trust at all levels of education. This proposal is based on 1) the
increased importance for trust in our lives, as I have claimed before, 2)
the suggestion that trust is never fixed, that it takes a long time to be
established and a short time to be destroyed, and 3) the first two dimen-
sions of trust stated before: trust as a characteristic of relationships,
and trust as a form of social intelligence. Before proceeding with these
dimensions though, we need to look closely at the third dimension ,
stated above―the cultural dimension.
Trust and Japanese culture
Francis Fukuyama (1995) believed that trust was the important so-
cial capital missing from low trust societies―Chinese societies, Italy,
Korea and France―and in abundance in high−trust societies―Japan,
Germany, and the US―that enabled the latter to become economically
successful, and the former to struggle . If we accepted his version of
what constitutes “low trust” and “high trust” then we may immediately
wonder if trust is such a positive thing after all, considering the respon-
sibilities that the three “high trust” countries share for the suffering re-
sulting from major wars.
However, his analysis has been questioned, in regard to Japan, by
Yamagishi (1998). Yamagishi argues that Fukuyama has confused the
high security of (past) collectivist Japan with trust, and labeled Japan a
high trusting society. Using Heimer’s distinctions from our introduction,
Fukuyama has confused trust with confidence or faith . Yamagishi be-
lieves that the past trust of villages or communities was not really trust,
but confidence based on knowledge and security that comes from small
“closed” communities. Yamagishi thus claims that not only is Japan a
low−trust society, but that this is a direct result of its collectivistic na-
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ture. He argues that “collectivist society produces security but destroys
trust” (p. 9). Like most other theorists, he also believes in the positive
power of trust, claiming that trust “emancipates people from closed rela-
tions and leads them to form spontaneous relations with new partners”
(p. 11).
Yamagishi’s (1998) arguments are based on numerous empirical
studies he has undertaken with his colleagues in Japan. His results are
corroborated by other empirical data reported in Hofstede’s (2001) semi-
nal work on cross−cultural differences, which show that collectivism has
a negative correlation with measures of trusting. These results are also
complemented by journalistic accounts (e. g. Zielenziger, 2006) and anec-
dotal evidence of the lived experience of many Japanese and non−Japa-
nese living in Japan, including the present author.
Yamagishi’s experimental results and his discussion of them in rela-
tion to Japanese society were what initially stimulated my interest in
the area of trust. His grounded argument that high trusters are not na-
ive or gullible, but actually more competent than low trusters at picking
up on clues which can help one to make judgements about whether to
trust someone or not, supports his belief that trust is a form of social in-
telligence (Yamagishi, 1998, 2001), rather than a personality trait. This
also was an important impetus for turning my interest in trust towards
education. Before moving on to social intelligence and education, how-
ever, I would like to return to the issue of confusion over what trust is.
One approach to getting through the confusion is not by contrasting
trust with what it isn’t but by proposing different forms of trust.
Authentic trust, simple trust, blind trust − a Pendulum of Trust
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It should be clear that the trust I’m referring to is not a form of
simple or naive trust. The trust I’m proposing is what Solomon and Flo-
res (2001) call authentic trust . This view of trust does not deny distrust
or consider it to be its opposite. It encompasses distrust, and goes be-
yond it. In order to fully describe the nature of authentic trust, how it
differs from other forms of trust, and how it may be conceptualized and
used to assess relationships, I have developed a Pendulum of Trust, an
adaptation of Stuart Rees’ (2003) Pendulum of Power (see Figure 1). It
is a pendulum rather than a line representing a continuum, to show
movement back and forth.
Rees’ Pendulum of Power distinguishes amongst unidimensional
power―dictatorial or autocratic power―on the left, seemingly shared
two−dimensional power in the middle, and multi−dimensional power on
the right.
My initial adaptation of this to a Pendulum of Trust (see Figure 2)
intentionally makes a direct connection between power and trust . In
this pendulum, authentic trust is definitely on the right. Simple trust is
towards the left, not on the extreme left, which is the position for blind
trust , and its partner distrust of the Other . I will clarify these forms of
Figure１．Rees’ Pendulum of Power (Rees, 2003, p. 67).
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trust starting from the left of the pendulum and moving towards the
right.
Blind trust
Blind trust, according to Volkan (2004), is a perversion of basic
trust of a leader of a group. This is probably accompanied by complete
distrust of the Other, the image of others as being opposed to members
of the group. The basic trust that is perverted is the trust of Erik Erik-
son (1963). The trust that a child learns in his 1st stage of psycho−social
development. The trust that the child acquires in the caretaker develops
into trust in the environment, and eventually trust in herself. In my
view, basic trust is a component of all forms of trust, but in the case of
blind trust it is a perverted form. Blind trust is placed on the extreme
left, as I consider it to be the most unidimensional and dangerous form
of trust.
Simple trust
According to Solomon and Flores (2001), simple trust is “the un-
thinking emotional attitude we would all like to assume regarding our
fellow citizens and which we hope we can take for granted with our
friends and family” (p. 60). It is unthinking and unreflective―a kind of
Figure２．The Pendulum of Trust.
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default idea of trust. It consists primarily of basic trust, but basic trust
can become conscious, whereas simple trust remains unconscious. It is
also simple in the sense that it is taken for granted and doesn’t include
any thought of the possibility of distrust. We hold it as a kind of pre-
cious ideal, but whereas it might be appropriate in families with small
children, it’s necessary to give it up in order to develop a more sophisti-
cated form of trust. On the pendulum, I conceive of it as somewhere left
of center, to where the arrow is pointing in Figure 2. Though, there may
be a range within simple trust itself, from left of center to right of cen-
ter.
Authentic trust
Solomon and Flores (2001) contrasting authentic trust with simple
trust, sees simple trust as “focused optimism” (p. 92), and authentic
trust as “self −confident rather than simply optimistic. Its focus is on
one’s own responsibilities in trusting. Authentic trust is trust that is
well aware of the risks, dangers, and liabilities of trust, but maintains
the self−confidence to trust nevertheless” (p. 92). They suggest that sim-
ple trust can be transformed into authentic trust, and often is, but usu-
ally as a result of some form of traumatic experience, such as tragedies
within families. The simple trust that was taken for granted prior to the
traumatic event, comes to the fore and needs to be negotiated in order
to hold the bonds of the relationship together. Trauma is, however, not
necessary for simple trust to be transformed into authentic trust. A deep
commitment to a relationship, with a strong sense of self−awareness, is
necessary. It is a commitment for the sake of the relationship, and not
as a means to a selfish end, though, Solomon and Flores claim, authen-
tic trust usually has optimal results. This is why I have placed authen-
tic trust on the extreme right of the Pendulum of Trust in Figure 2.
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Using these definitions of forms of trust as a way of analyzing dis-
agreements about trust, we can argue that Fukuyama’s claim of Japan
being a high trusting society may be based on simple trust, while Yam-
agishi’s claim of Japan being a low trusting society may be based on
authentic trust. Authentic trust is certainly a form of trust that doesn’t
just happen or develop on its own. It needs self−confidence or, as some
would state, self−trust. It needs both conscious, rational thought as well
as more automatic, highly tuned, unconscious judgment. It is the real
meaning of trust as a form of social intelligence. It is also the basis for
my argument for trust to be a focus in education.
Social intelligence
If one believes that intelligence, or intelligences, can be developed,
then the idea that trust is a form of social intelligence leads quickly to
the conclusion that it can be nurtured and developed through education.
Daniel Goleman, the famed advocate of emotional intelligence, thinks
so . He has recently turned his attention towards social intelligence ,
which he claims was subsumed by emotional intelligence, but which de-
serves its own category in its own right. He considers social intelligence
to consist of two broad categories: social awareness and social facility
(2006, p. 84). Social awareness includes primal empathy (a basic sensing
of others’ feelings), attunement (real listening), empathic accuracy, and
social cognition. These abilities seem to me to be necessary ones for
making authentic trusting judgments , both carefully considered and
spontaneous ones. Social facility, on the other hand, includes synchrony
(interacting well non−verbally), self−presentation, influence, and con-
cern. These seem to be necessary skills for displaying trustworthiness.
Goleman considers both of these categories to include conscious, cogni-
tive capacities―what he calls the “high road” of the brain―and uncon-
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scious, emotional ones―the “low road” of the brain. Moreover, he argues
that research shows that both of these types of capacities, the conscious
as well as the unconscious, can be developed through training. The re-
sulting increase in social intelligence can have a profound impact on be-
havior, happiness, and life in general.
Towards a pedagogy of trust
Trust in the classroom and the curriculum
My argument for a pedagogy of trust is aimed at putting a focus on
developing authentic trust at all levels of education and throughout the
complete context in which education is delivered. It includes the above−
mentioned Cooperative Learning, learner autonomy and individual ap-
proaches to building trust in the classroom. The teacher has the ulti-
mate responsibility here for presenting her trustworthiness to students
and for being authentically trusting of students in the way in which the
curriculum is practiced in the classroom. The Pendulum of Trust is use-
ful here for teachers to gauge, not the amount of trust they put in their
students, but the form of trust on which they base their relationships
with the class as a whole and with the individual students.
A focus on trust in the classroom should be based on two ap-
proaches: a conscious discussion of trust as part of the content of the
class, and a less cognitive approach, where the process of the class is
based on authentic trust amongst teachers and students. Students thus
learn about trust and experience authentic trust in action. Details of
classroom practice and activities is beyond the scope of this paper, and
will ultimately depend on the individual teacher’s context and style, but
reflection on the type of trust teachers use in their classes and a focus
on developing authentic trust is a solid basis for making decisions about
－ 97 －
the course goals, and individual lesson plans.
Trust in schools
While there has been some focus on the aspect of developing trust
in the classroom―self−trust, a trusting atmosphere, and trust between
teacher and students―it hasn’t been generally accepted as being an im-
portant aspect of education in itself, usually only as a means to the end
of improving learning of the content of the subject. Making a case for a
focus on developing trust in schools as a whole, Kochanek (2005) argues
that “Increasing trust in schools has been linked to increased participa-
tion among faculty in school reform efforts, greater openness to innova-
tions among teachers, increased outreach to parents, and even higher
academic productivity in a school” (p. xv). As this suggests, a pedagogy
of trust should not be seen as limited to the classroom. A trusting envi-
ronment not only enhances trust in the classroom, it provides the lived
experience of effective trusting that is necessary to build on the uncon-
scious, non−cognitive, “low road” capacities of the brain.
The onus on changing trusting relations from simple trust, or even
blind trust, towards a more authentic form of trust lies ultimately with
those in power: from headmasters and headmistresses of schools and
university presidents and deans, to department heads, center directors,
and team leaders. It involves analyzing the current state of human rela-
tions amongst the major players and working deliberately towards
change. A major obstacle to this is what Solomon and Flores (2001) re-
fer to as “cordial hypocrisy” (p. 4), the pretense of trust when actually
there is none, and characterized by public politeness in the name of har-
mony. The Pendulum of Trust helps us to differentiate authentic trust
from other forms of trust and to assess the relationships under scrutiny
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in terms of how authentically people trust each other.
Conclusion
Trust is ever−present, multi−dimensional, and powerful. It comes in
different forms, and is used in everyday life and in the research litera-
ture to refer to different, but related, concepts. In focusing on trust, it is
important to distinguish amongst different forms of trust, and to iden-
tify the important issues. Applying it to education in a concerted way in-
volves all players, but the responsibility for initiating change towards
authentic trusting behavior rests with those in power. This implies a
change in the way they use their authority to affect change in the edu-
cational context. Change within the classroom necessitates the teacher
changing their way of teaching as well as the focus of their teaching to
incorporate trust as a central principle in the curriculum.
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